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Swiss Agency for Development  
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# Cooperation Programme Phasing out Programme Bolivia 2022–24



# Contents

<b>Foreword</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1. Context analysis</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2. Objectives of Switzerland’s foreign policy for Bolivia</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>3. Results achieved by Swiss Development Cooperation in Bolivia to date</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>4. Implications</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>5. Objectives and theory of change</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>6. Phasing out Programme management</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>7. Monitoring system</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Annexes</b>	<b>18</b>
Annex 1a: Cooperation Programme scenarios and adaptations	19
Annex 1b: Effects of COVID-19	25
Annex 2: Objectives and outcomes in each thematic area	26
Annex 3: Monitoring system	34
Annex 4: Planned budget 2022 - 2024	35
Annex 5: Acronyms and abbreviations	36
Annex 6: Maps	38

# Foreword



Switzerland has engaged in cooperation for development in Bolivia since 1969. For more than fifty years, people in a situation of poverty and vulnerability have been empowered, placing particular emphasis on working with young people and women over the last decade.

In the last 15 years, Bolivia has been able to take advantage of positive economic conditions and take forward far-reaching social reforms. As a result, Bolivia has managed to reduce relative poverty from 46% to 31%, while extreme poverty has fallen from 21% to 12% (figures from the National Institute of Statistics). Women and indigenous people continue to be more disadvantaged in the economy and society.

Switzerland's long-term commitment to economic development and climate change adaptation has enabled it to contribute successfully to these processes, by offering sustainable and effective local solutions. In this mountainous, multicultural and highly biodiverse country, supporting communities and promoting dialogue and cooperation between the state and civil society have been the cornerstones of Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC).

The COVID-19 pandemic and the political and social crisis Bolivia underwent in October 2019 are now estimated to have set the country back by some five years in terms of economic development and poverty reduction. Due to the pandemic, extreme poverty rose from 12% to 14.7% and relative poverty from 31% to 37.5%. Bolivia still has the lowest GDP per capita in South America. Nevertheless, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, Bolivia is expected to pass the threshold to become an upper middle-income country in 2024. With the International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2024, the Swiss Parliament decided to phase out its

bilateral development cooperation work in Latin America by 2024, in order to focus its efforts on other regions such as North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

Switzerland's lengthy experience in development cooperation with Bolivia, together with its commitment to a responsible phase out designed to ensure sustainable outcomes, provide a solid foundation for efficient planning and implementation of the Phasing out Programme set out in this document.

This Phasing out Programme will continue to focus the work of SDC in Bolivia on three thematic areas which are essential for sustainable improvement in the living conditions of the country's poorest people: Economic Development, Governance, and Climate Change and the Environment. Attention will continue to be paid to disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, especially young people and women. This work will be accompanied by strategic and responsible knowledge management, concentrating on those who will take forward the innovations supported by SDC in the future: the private sector and the state, decision-makers in municipal and departmental governments and ministries, and the development organisations and actors that remain in the country and its regions.

Switzerland's engagement with Latin America will continue by means of other cooperation instruments, such as on climate change and water issues, as well as economic development. Latin America will also be able to count on humanitarian aid from Switzerland in emergency situations in the future.

It is a priority for Switzerland to maintain and continue to develop the bonds of trust that have characterised its relationship with Bolivia for the last fifty years.

A blue ink signature of Patricia Danzi, consisting of stylized, flowing letters.

**Patricia Danzi**  
SDC Director General



# 1. Context analysis

Bolivia has been living through exceptional times, due to the serious political and human rights crisis that followed the national election in October 2019 and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which worsened social and economic problems and inequalities. Although the political crisis was eased by the democratic and transparent elections that led to a new national government and local authorities between October 2020 and March 2021, the conditions for development, democracy and social cohesion remain fragile. This complex crisis arose after a decade of social improvements and economic growth and the construction of the Plurinational State, which aimed to expand rights and promote inclusion, especially of indigenous people. Despite the progress achieved, the state is still heavily centralised, the independence of powers is weak, institution-building is slow, and the government has become estranged from some sectors of civil society.

The post-electoral conflict in November 2019, which led to the resignation of President Evo Morales and subsequent political instability, weakened the country's institutions and increased social and political polarisation. Numerous cases of arbitrary arrest were documented by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Following the election of Luis Arce Catacora, the MAS candidate<sup>1</sup>, with 55% of the vote and a majority in the Legislative Assembly, the political situation has largely stabilised. With a higher percentage of opposition representatives in the national parliament and at the subnational level, a more plural and balanced scenario has taken shape. Nevertheless, political dialogue is very difficult, with the risk of a recurrent upsurge in social conflict. The problems with the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary have not been resolved and there is little respect for due process of law. Instability persists in the civil service, decentralisation does not function properly, and human rights are not guaranteed for all. In the Corruption Perceptions Index, Bolivia is ranked third from the bottom among the twelve countries in South America, ahead of Paraguay and Venezuela.<sup>2</sup> These challenges worsen the multiple inequalities which lead, for example, to the country having the fourth highest rate of femicides in Latin America as a proportion of the population.

Economic growth fell to 2.2% in 2019, after ten years of growth exceeding 4%. A large government budget deficit has built up



(7.2% of GDP), together with a trade imbalance and deteriorating external accounts. Due to the pandemic, the percentage of workers in the informal economy has increased by 15% to reach 85%,<sup>3</sup> alongside productivity problems, a low level of diversification and a reliance on the production of raw materials.<sup>4</sup> These economic trends were made worse by the standstill in economic activity caused by the pandemic and the political crisis: GDP fell by 7.7% in 2020 and poverty rose from 31% to 37.5%. Although the economy has begun to revive since the end of 2020, the recovery is still uncertain. According to recent IMF forecasts (from April 2021), even though Bolivia continues to have the continent's fourth lowest GDP per capita, the country is expected to pass the threshold of 4.045 USD per capita to become an upper middle-income country in 2024.<sup>5</sup>

In the social sphere, Bolivia has increased the coverage of education, water, basic sanitation and electricity services over the last decade. However, there are still shortcomings in the quality of these services. Public health is a sector that has lagged behind and suffers from weak coordination, fragmentation, and the chronic problem of a lack of resources. The deficiencies

<sup>1</sup> The Movement towards Socialism (MAS) is the political party of former president Evo Morales.

<sup>2</sup> According to the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2020).

<sup>3</sup> The percentage of workers in the informal sector is the highest in Latin America (source: ILO 2020).

<sup>4</sup> Mainly exports of natural gas to Argentina and Brazil and soya and minerals to Asia.

<sup>5</sup> Prior to the pandemic, the IMF predicted that this reclassification would take place in 2021.

in the health and education systems were even more clearly evident during the pandemic, which resulted in one of the ten highest mortality rates in the world, as well as difficulties in providing adequate distance education to all children. Social protection measures were likewise insufficient.

In recent years, the environment has deteriorated and the country has become increasingly vulnerable to climate change, which is leading to water shortages and lower food security, affecting biodiversity and causing more frequent and intense natural disasters (drought and floods), due to the policies on resource extraction and clearing more land to be used for farming. These developments are having a huge social and economic impact, especially on the poorest people. Ongoing urbanisation, with 69.8% of the population now living in urban areas, is giving rise to new environmental challenges, including the sustainable management of solid waste and water. Policies on climate change and productive development have so far made little impact.

Bolivia belongs to several regional organisations and is aligned ideologically with other Latin American countries on the left (Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico and Argentina). In the area of economic integration, Bolivia has been an associate member of MERCOSUR since 2012 and its full membership still needs to be approved by the parliament of the bloc's largest member, Brazil. Full membership would enable Bolivia to benefit from this regional integration process by strengthening trade and socio-economic ties with its most important neighbours, Brazil and Argentina, and would also ensure that its exports could access Atlantic ports.

Unavoidable challenges include a structural reform of the justice system, the strengthening and independence of the bodies that safeguard human rights, and a reform of the state to strengthen the powers of subnational institutions and boost their resources. Protection and access to justice mechanisms need to be consolidated, especially those aimed at people in a vulnerable situation (women, young people, migrants, people held in detention). There is also a need to promote social cohesion and reconciliation to consolidate democracy through dialogue between different sectors and actors. Switzerland can support moderate tendencies as part of international and bilateral dialogue. Thanks to its credibility and the broad network of contacts it has built up over more than fifty years of cooperation work, it has good potential to play a "bridge-building" role.

In the area of economic reactivation, there are still challenges with regard to the diversification of production, restoring the income of the most vulnerable groups, a better redistribution of income by means of a more flexible tax policy, and enhanced social security. Education and training for human resources is a key priority to enable these challenges to be addressed. After the pandemic, there is awareness of the need to develop agriculture (Andean foods and cocoa, for example), manufacturing and/or services that respect the environment, and the potential to do so. Switzerland's continued support for technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and responsible gold mining is timely.

Nevertheless, it is still a major challenge for Bolivia to reconcile economic interests, which are mainly based on the exploitation of natural resources, with the priority of protecting the environment and combating climate change. These contradictions have become evident in the willingness to allow extractive activities (fossil fuels, mining) to take place in protected areas, as well as the drive to clear more land for agriculture, which has led to an increase in forest fires and high rates of deforestation in recent years. On the other hand, the leadership role that Bolivia could play in international forums on the environment, presenting itself as a leader in the legal recognition of the rights of Mother Earth<sup>6</sup> and indigenous peoples, as well as the international commitments involved in the fulfilment of its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), could influence the adoption of environmentally sustainable policies. The increase in the negative effects of climate change could also take the country in this direction and will require greater resilience, enhanced environmental management capacities and an improvement in disaster risk management. The global interest in climate change prevention and biodiversity protection is also a priority for Switzerland and will continue to require international solidarity.

International cooperation funding has become less relevant as a percentage of GDP (falling from 25% to 6% between 2005 and 2013). It is currently estimated to account for 2% of GDP. Switzerland is a medium-sized donor among the bilaterals and is involved in policy dialogue and coordination circles such as the Development Partners Group (GruS)<sup>7</sup> as well as the European Joint Programming 2021-2025. There is an ongoing tendency for some donor countries to reduce, restructure or close down their cooperation programmes in keeping with new national strategy approaches.

6 For example, the Vice-President is seeking to set up an institution to defend the rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia, based on the Law of Mother Earth (Madre Tierra) (2010).

7 The GruS brings together the donors working in Bolivia, including bilateral cooperation agencies, international organisations and development banks. As well as the multilateral organisations (such as the UN, World Bank, IDB and CAF) and the EU, the donor countries that are members of the OECD-DAC are: Germany (in the process of withdrawing), Canada, South Korea, Spain, the United States, France, Italy (in the process of withdrawing), Japan, Sweden and Switzerland (in the process of phasing out).

## 2. Objectives of Switzerland's foreign policy for Bolivia



Bolivia and Switzerland established diplomatic relations more than 75 years ago and since 1969 Switzerland has been providing bilateral development cooperation support. Due to this long-term commitment, responsive to the changing local situation, which has produced tangible and lasting results, Switzerland enjoys a good reputation and a high level of credibility among Bolivian partners and in the international community. Its position as a neutral country with a transparent agenda, its stability and democratic tradition and its multiculturalism also represent potential sources of inspiration for Bolivia. Finally, Switzerland is highly respected for its humanitarian tradition and its very competitive and innovative economy.

Switzerland also works with other cooperation instruments: the global water and climate change programmes, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) interventions, Private Sector Engagement (PSE) in TVET with Nestlé, and the complementary measures

and global programmes of the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) and the Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets (SIFEM), with lines of funding for local microfinance institutions. Furthermore, several Swiss NGOs have been supporting the country for a long time. Swiss academics are working closely with local universities on sustainable natural resource management issues.

The Bilateral Cooperation Phasing out Programme for Bolivia 2022-2024 is framed within **Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2024** and the **Regional Guidelines for Latin America and the Caribbean 2021-2024**. The decision to concentrate on other regions of the world (Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe) was taken in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of Switzerland's international cooperation and give priority to aid in geographical regions where the need is greatest. This reorientation

means that **between 2021 and 2024 Switzerland's bilateral development cooperation will be phased out in Bolivia**, Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua and Honduras. Switzerland's commitment to Latin America and the Caribbean will continue through other diplomatic, cooperation and humanitarian assistance instruments.

**The Regional Guidelines have two objectives:** first, to ensure that the programme developed in Bolivia contributes to the Cooperation Strategy (CS) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); second, to align the Phasing out Programme for Bolivia with the Guidelines in keeping with a responsible phasing out of bilateral cooperation.

Another reference document is the Federal Council's **Strategy for the Americas 2022-2025**. Switzerland's engagement focuses on peace and security, human rights, prosperity and sustainability in the countries covered until now by the bilateral development cooperation provided by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). These approaches will be maintained by means of other international cooperation instruments. In addition, the FDFA's Human Rights Guidelines 2021-2024 are a key point of reference for activities related to human rights.





# 3. Results achieved by Swiss Development Cooperation in Bolivia to date

Among **the results achieved in various programmes over time**, bilateral cooperation in Bolivia has made important contributions in the following thematic areas:

- **Community forestry:** key contributions to Andean community reforestation in the departments of Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Potosí and Tarija.
- **Financial services for rural areas:** contributions to the design of public policies, institution-building, and access to credit and other financial services by small-scale producers. Consolidation of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and their inclusion in the legislation governing the financial system.
- **Water resources management and climate change adaption:** aportes en la gobernabilidad, mediante el desarrollo de normativas y la incorporación de actores sociales en la gestión integral de cuencas. Implementación del enfoque de resiliencia ante efectos del cambio climático a nivel territorial.
- **Disaster risk management:** inclusion of the disaster prevention and resilience-building approach in community planning processes.
- **Decentralisation and strengthening municipal government:** contributions to the strengthening of democracy, decentralisation and services at the municipal level.
- **Human rights:** contributions to the human rights of vulnerable groups, support for women in a situation of violence, the prevention of gender-based violence, the empowerment of women and indigenous peoples for active citizenship and political participation, and the development of alternative conflict resolution methods.
- **Culture and development:** promotion of the culture and development approach, cultural democratisation and intercultural dialogue (between Bolivia and Switzerland, cities and surrounding regions). Significant contribution

to skills development and networks of artists and cultural managers, and contribution to the discussion of public policies on culture.

During **the time of the Cooperation Strategy (CS) 2018-2021**, impacts were achieved on public policies at the three levels of the state to improve people's quality of life and the quality, quantity and coverage of public services, especially locally. In a political, social and economic context characterised by social conflicts and the COVID-19 pandemic, **the overall assessment of the effectiveness of the CS is rated as medium to high**. The Swiss portfolio has shown a **high execution capacity**, as evidenced in cost-benefit studies with positive results, and the ability to adapt to the adverse health and political situation. **On sustainability, performance is rated as average**. Progress has been made on strengthening and developing the capacities of actors at all levels, as well as their ownership and empowerment. The ongoing crisis has limited resource allocation and the financial contributions of counterparts.

**Governance** The Swiss portfolio is making a qualitative and quantitative contribution to the delivery of public justice services and the campaign against violence; however, it will not achieve 100% of the established objective. According to a cost-effectiveness study (2018), the time it takes to resolve a case through conciliation is five times shorter and the costs are six times lower, meaning that this represents a contribution to the citizen and savings for the state. As a result of the work to counter violence, more than 1/3 of the municipalities now have integrated legal services, and the multi-stakeholder networks that have been set up to counter violence are encouraging more women to report incidents of violence (more than 150.000 between 2018 and 2020). Finally, the Collaborative Dialogue and Support (DAC) project to support civil society surpassed its target for the number of Bolivian NGOs presenting proposals on key development issues in the project's first year (2020).

**Economic Development** The bilateral programme made satisfactory progress in several dimensions of the results

framework, such as access to improved financial and non-financial services and increased productivity in urban and rural businesses. More than 11.000 students (60% young people) graduated as a result of the TVET project. It is envisaged that 85% of the job improvement target will be achieved, which is moderately satisfactory given the current recession, while the target of increasing incomes has been exceeded, mainly due to the contribution of agricultural projects (133%) and, to a lesser extent, urban projects (89%), which were the most affected by the political and health crisis over the last year. SECO's complementary measures made a relevant contribution, especially SCORE, which supported the reactivation of productive urban MSEs; and Global Trade Facilitation, which enabled the National Customs Authority to move forward on global commitments to facilitate trade and establish measures for the rapid import of supplies during the pandemic.

**Climate Change and the Environment** The programme contributed to advocacy on public policies in the CCA, EM and DRR sectors at the three levels of the state, to improve watershed management, conservation and environmental management. The quality of life of the target population has improved (in terms of health, income, capabilities and participation in decision-making). Thanks to the advocacy work, public investment in CCA, EM and DRR has been, on average, higher than 4.5% of the overall budget for the last three years in the areas where the programme is working (2017 baseline: 1%). The work to strengthen the capacities of public institutions achieved an improvement in environmental management and resilience to climate change in 103 local governments.

The **main lessons learned** include:

- **Anchoring in civil society** is required for progress on sustainability and democratisation. Work with civil society organisations (CSOs) leads to demands for accountability and a more effective response to specific problems, more and better services, transparency and participation.
- **Technical and policy dialogue**, based on evidence and results, has demonstrated its value for moving forward with the implementation of projects as agreed.
- **The involvement of a wide range of stakeholders at the territorial level**, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by decentralisation, enables local financing to be managed more effectively. Taking local knowledge into account likewise promotes shared responsibility among participants.

# 4. Implications



The design of the Phasing out Programme took into account the current situation of multiple crises, especially those related to the pandemic. The assumption drawn from the scenario assessment (April 2021) is that the most likely scenario is the settlement of **a democratic situation, but with governance problems** (see Annexes 1a and 1b).

This scenario would allow space for development but would be more demanding in terms of the relationship with the government, which could be marked by distrust. In addition, the high turnover of staff in the public sector could cause difficulties for international cooperation with regard to relationships and effectiveness. **Nevertheless, the assessment is that there will be sufficient conditions and political will to give continuity to Switzerland's bilateral programme** with greater involvement in other Swiss cooperation instruments.

**Switzerland's added value** in international cooperation can

continue to be deployed. This is rooted in its unique capacity to combine Switzerland's strong points with a high level of expertise in sectors that are relevant both to Switzerland and to its partner countries. This approach, combined with **a physical presence**, enables Switzerland to implement cooperation programmes **well suited to the context**, including the **development of good quality technologies that are relevant and sustainable** for the target population. Switzerland's international cooperation also stands out for its comprehensive and systemic approach, which creates less dependence on the donor, together with its capacity to create spaces for cooperation between the three levels of the state, as well as with civil society. Forging links as a **knowledge facilitator** could continue to be the key role of a Swiss Representation, thus guaranteeing that Bolivia can continue to draw on Switzerland's added value.

The **three thematic areas** help to address problems acknowledged to be key for the country. Accordingly, **the strategic**



**thematic orientation continues to be up-to-date and relevant.** The issues likely to be given priority in the forthcoming Economic and Social Development Plan (PDES) 2021-2025 are those directly related to reactivating the economy and addressing the social effects of the health crisis. There are also opportunities for international financing and technical assistance (from the EU and the Green Climate Fund, for example) that will help to ensure that the thematic areas continue to be relevant. It is envisaged that the bilateral programme in Bolivia will come to an end in 2024, with a gradual phasing out from the different areas of intervention. Until 2023, the areas to be given priority will be **climate change and the environment and economic development**, which will be addressed in a comprehensive way. The Swiss intra-governmental approach known as the Whole of Government Approach (WOGA) will be prioritised in these thematic areas. Work on the thematic area of **governance** will conclude in 2022. This earlier phasing out is based on the financial plan, which does not allow for work to continue to the end of the period on all three sectors, portfolio performance, and the lack of potential to work with other Swiss cooperation instruments.

**Governance** will focus on a **cross-cutting approach** in the Swiss programme. This will enable work to continue on the structural causes of conflicts, inequalities and political fragility in Bolivia. The cross-cutting nature of the Collaborative Dialogue and Support (DAC) project should be highlighted. It will continue to support Bolivian civil society organisations in the current portfolio's thematic areas.

**On climate change and the environment**, SDC's global programmes in the Andean region (Water and Climate Change) envisage a plan for the next fifteen years and aim to place Bolivia on the radar of its new initiatives. There is potential to

make links between this thematic area and humanitarian aid projects on DRR. The Phasing out Programme can therefore be used to reinforce the synergies between the three cooperation instruments and work with a **nexus orientation**. The sector is also favourable for collaboration with Swiss universities on applied research. SECO will continue to work on specific projects<sup>8</sup> and global programmes.<sup>9</sup> There is potential to continue with SECO's global initiatives, moving gradually from complementarity with bilateral cooperation to links with global programmes and humanitarian aid.

**On economic development**, SECO will remain active with complementary measures<sup>10</sup> and is expected to provide a future commitment to ensure the sustainability of programmes that aim to promote more attractive conditions for international trade and the private sector, with a view to fostering the creation of value chains and supporting small and medium enterprises. The potential of the so-called superfoods (quinoa, cañihua, tarwi, amaranth) in European markets and the links that can be forged between the work done at the bilateral level and other Swiss cooperation instruments (global programmes, SIPPO-SECO) should be highlighted. Finally, Private Sector Engagement should continue as a priority for the International Cooperation Strategy, seeking to obtain funding for the public sector side through other cooperation instruments.

8 The Better Gold Initiative until 2025 and Resilient Cities until 2024.

9 The Global Water Security & Sanitation Partnership (GWSP) is still operational for Bolivia, as it is currently in phase 2 (2019-2023). It forms part of the World Bank's Global Water Practice, for which SECO allocates funds to address the main challenges in the water and sanitation sector.

10 The Global Trade Facilitation Programme until 2022, potentially with an extension until the end of 2023; Sustaining Competitive and Responsible Enterprises (SCORE), with a 4th phase for 2022-2024 currently under preparation.

# 5. Objectives and theory of change

In the context described above and given the imminent phasing out of the bilateral cooperation in Bolivia, the theory of change that guides the Bilateral Cooperation Phasing out Programme 2022-2024 is designed to ensure that the outcomes are sustainable, drive systemic change in the areas worked on and bring about changes that last beyond the phasing out, by drawing on the good practices, knowledge, innovations and models promoted by Switzerland in current or future programmes, partners or instruments. Within the Swiss portfolio, priority will be given to the culture of peace, greater social inclusion, and economic and environmental resilience, through more intensive advocacy on laws, public policies, institutions, and improved public services and educational and productive technologies.

**The overall objective of the new cooperation cycle**, which the three thematic areas of governance, economic development, and climate change and the environment will all help to achieve, has been adapted as follows: Following the phasing out of Switzerland's bilateral cooperation, there are actors in a position to promote sustainable development and the reduction of poverty and inequality, forums for dialogue between a diverse range of stakeholders have been expanded, and the resilience of communities and institutions has been strengthened.

The Swiss programme will continue to focus on the needs of the most vulnerable groups (small-scale producers, micro-entrepreneurs, women, young people and indigenous people) in the **Altiplano and valleys regions**. The aim is to bring about social and economic inclusion and reduce the major disparities (gender, ethnic, territorial and generational) that are characteristic of a middle-income country, and which are the underlying causes of political and social tensions.

On **Governance**, actions to guarantee the continuity of access to justice services and the campaign against violence against women will be consolidated, and forums for inclusive and constructive dialogue between the state and civil society will be promoted. The programme's lines of intervention will therefore focus on developing the institutional capacities of CSOs and counterpart institutions, strengthening collaborative dialogue, and enhanced participation by civil society in development processes at the local and national level. Studies

and research that produce evidence for horizontal and informed policy dialogue will continue to be promoted. Finally, as a lesson learned from the COVID crisis, more work will be done with Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) to reduce the digital gap and produce a multiplier effect on communication for development.



On **Economic Development**, the work will seek to bring about greater inclusion, equity, and economic, social and environmental resilience in communities with the potential to overcome poverty. The portfolio's lines of intervention will seek to consolidate the achievements in TVET, with an emphasis on the transfer to the Ministry of Education and private sector participation. Inclusive business models will be strengthened to achieve critical mass and sustainability. The work to increase the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises and facilitate access to export markets will continue, seeking synergies between SDC and SECO. Linking the different projects in this thematic area with public and private financial services, including opportunities with SIFEM, will continue to be essential for the future funding of sustainable services. Finally, work will be done to develop and promote digitalisation in the delivery of education, financial and non-financial services.



On **Climate Change and the Environment**, the work will improve capacities to adapt to climate change and solve environmental problems through the efficient implementation of public policies, strengthening networks and the capacities of key actors, and increasing resilience and access to services for people in a vulnerable situation. To achieve these aims, the interventions will concentrate on advocacy with a view to consolidating sectoral public policies, as well as the development of professional and technical capacities and competencies (for example, in the Plurinational Authority for Mother Earth - APMT). Applied research on climate

change adaptation will continue to play an important role in producing evidence. The work to consolidate replicable climate resilience models and improve environmental quality services in urban and rural areas will continue. A priority is to forge links and build synergies with other cooperation instruments.



**Other areas of work:** until 2023, the Swiss Cultural Fund (SCF) will continue helping to enable Bolivian society to move forward towards social cohesion through the initiatives of artists and/or cultural groups. This work is rooted in democratic values, respect for the diversity of cultural identities, and intercultural dialogue. Two of the expected outcomes seek sustainability, aiming to ensure that 40% of the projects implemented obtain support from the state and/or the private sector, and that initiatives are inspired by and adopt good practices related to policy influencing and/or cultural enterprises.

**Programme management objectives:** all the projects will complete their operational phases satisfactorily within the established timeframe. The projects in the Swiss portfolio all have Knowledge Management (KM) strategies and will implement these to contribute to sustainability and ensure that tools, models and good practices are transferred to state institutions, civil society and private sector organisations, and other donors/instruments. The phasing out approach for each project, with three variants of closeout (phasing down, phasing out and phasing over), will be applied and accompanied by the Embassy. In governance, for example, with a pha-

sing-over approach, alliances with like-minded donors will be forged in 2021/2022. Policy and technical dialogue and advocacy to consolidate sectoral processes and public policies will be taken forward in the three thematic areas. Thus, on climate change and the environment, the Swiss contribution to the National River Basin Plan (PNC) will continue, as will research on climate change in the university system.

In a context of greater fragility, the working principle of **Conflict-Sensitive Programme Management (CSPM)** will be reinforced, and the cross-cutting themes of **Governance, Gender and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)** continue to be relevant in this phasing out strategy. In the current situation, with decreasing resources available, it will be advisable to narrow the scope of the work on these cross-cutting themes to focus on their **most strategic aspects: knowledge management with systematisation of good practices, consolidation of competencies, and the transfer of methodologies and tools** to partners and local counterparts. The main instrument for the inclusion of the gender perspective will be the **Gender Action Plan**, involving all the Swiss projects for which this cross-cutting theme is relevant. Given that Governance and the CSPM approach have similar characteristics and mechanisms for context and stakeholder analysis, the two instruments will be more closely integrated to avoid overloading the partners and ensure that results are achieved more effectively. The working principle of DRR will be an integral part of projects that require infrastructure planning. With the Lima hub, training on the CEDRIG tool will be provided to partners, with the aim of training of local trainers.



# 6. Phasing out Programme management

This Phasing out Programme includes the **working principles** set out in the Regional Guidelines. Good relations will be maintained with international partners, in the spirit of SDG 17 and with a view to ensuring that their activities and advocacy contribute to the sustainability of the results of SDC. Furthermore, Switzerland has promoted the **trilateral cooperation** approach in Latin America for decades, with some notable results.

The **gradual phasing out arrangements** will focus on:

1. ensuring that the projects are implemented appropriately by the Bolivian government and partners;
2. forging links between the bilateral cooperation projects and SECO or SDC global programmes, other bilateral donor projects, or the regional and multilateral initiatives of United Nations agencies, the World Bank, the IDB<sup>11</sup> and other regional organisations such as the Organization of American States (OAS);
3. promoting contributions as a way to ensure greater sustainability.

On **governance**, the implementation modalities appropriate for a phasing out are a mixed approach that includes mandates, contributions to public sector institutions and CSOs, and partnerships with other donors making a financial contribution to Swiss projects. On **economic development**, there will likewise be mandates, delegated cooperation or contributions to local institutions (public and private), with gradually increasing counterpart contributions from these partners in a process of institutionalisation of the services. The same applies to the area of **climate change and the environment**. Should the scenario turn more fragile (with multiple crises), the focus would be on working with partners from the private sector or civil society and seek to achieve the outcomes sought. Such a situation could affect the sustainability agenda and lead to the premature closeout of the projects implemented by partners of the state.

<sup>11</sup> SDC will continue to be involved as a shareholder and active member of the IDB Board of Governors, together with SECO as the main interlocutor. In this context, Switzerland will work to ensure that the IDB takes up and supports its operational experiences in Latin America.



One important pillar of the Phasing out Programme is **partnerships** in the broad network of Embassy contacts with a range of national institutions (i.e. sectoral ministries, other powers of state, departmental and municipal governments, academia), as well as national and international NGOs, the private sector, and other members of the international community.

The **Ministry of Development Planning (MPD)** is the institution in charge of channelling and coordinating all international cooperation. The Embassy will maintain a transparent flow of information and regular dialogue with this institution, with a view to achieving a constructive relationship during this phasing out process. Policy dialogue with partners in the state will be key to ensure that the phasing out takes place in the established timeframe.

There is a risk that Switzerland's phasing out will reduce its relative importance in **the coordination circles** of the GruS or the European Joint Programming. At the same time, the experience of the last few years has demonstrated the difficulty of donor coordination and harmonisation in Bolivia and the limited possibilities for influencing sectoral policies and strategies by means of these mechanisms. Nevertheless, forums such as these are still necessary to maintain the connection with the international community and the best way to keep in contact with Bolivian state institutions; it will be necessary to engage through other cooperation instruments.

The Embassy in La Paz will work to **create strategic alliances with the UN (UNDP and OHCHR) and the IDB**, with the aim of continuing to build on the legacy of Swiss bilateral cooperation in other multilateral initiatives. It will also explore potential openings both with regional organisations and processes and with bilateral donors still working in Bolivia.

Relations with the **Lima hub** will intensify in view of the Triple Nexus. As part of its work in the Andean region on the subject of infrastructure resilience and disaster preparedness and response, good DRR practices will continue to be shared, under a knowledge management and replication approach. In line with Switzerland's humanitarian tradition, Bolivia will also continue to be included in the emergency humanitarian interventions programme.

There is also the possibility that some bilateral cooperation projects will continue to be implemented thanks to the commitment and experience of **large Swiss NGOs** (Helvetas, Swisscontact and Solidar Suisse). They envisage remaining active in Bolivia and their strategies include several of the bilateral cooperation portfolio's thematic areas.

Finally, as part of cultural cooperation, it will be important to forge closer links with Pro Helvetia and its new office in Latin America, and seek to establish collaboration between Bolivian cultural institutions and Swiss museums to support cultural heritage.

All this work on partnerships and building relationships of trust with local partners and decision-makers can only be done on the ground. It is an important aspect of international cooperation, whether in policy dialogue or in operational activities.

As an important principle for a responsible phasing out, **knowledge management and transfer** will contribute to the consolidation and sustainability of the bilateral cooperation efforts and support ownership and transfer of the Swiss legacy. In a learning organisation like SDC, knowledge management also implies transferring knowledge from the cooperation programmes in Bolivia and the Latin American region to head office.

**Communication** is key to a responsible phasing out strategy and its aim is to anchor the contributions made in Bolivia over the last 25 years or more of cooperation, provide key informa-

tion to reduce uncertainty and adverse reactions that may be provoked by the phasing out, and communicate Switzerland's priorities in the country as part of its bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations and those of the other SDC instruments.

At the start of 2021, the Embassy was implementing 15 projects, most of them with a timescale covering several years and a significant budget. The number of projects in the Swiss portfolio will gradually be reduced. Only eight projects will remain in 2023, and it is envisaged that their operations will conclude in October that year. Nevertheless, a margin of flexibility and a potential extension until June 2024 has been allowed for to manage the risk of possible delays in the project implementation and closeout process. Between July and September 2024, the Embassy will focus mainly on administrative closeout and, to a lesser extent, on monitoring SECO's ongoing projects. Given the importance of knowledge management and communication tasks, it is likely to be necessary to contract specialised services to carry them out, and this has been provided for in the budget. From 2022 onwards, the credit line for small projects will in principle only be used to strengthen the phasing out strategy, either to assist the projects with the transfer and institutionalisation process, to bolster the cross-cutting themes or the knowledge management work, or for communication purposes.

A total budget of 15 million CHF is forecast for the three years of this programme. The plan does not leave room for new strategic decisions. The amounts are committed under agreements and contracts, and the challenge is to support the counterpart organisations to ensure that the commitments can be met in the time envisaged. The amount of 1 million has been set aside for 2024 to cover the last few payments corresponding to the commitments (see the budget in Annex 4). The thematic concentration of the bilateral cooperation budget in Bolivia will rise to 94% as a result of focusing on the projects in the three main thematic areas. The remaining 6% will be devoted to efforts to support the phasing out process, issues closely related to the thematic areas, and 1% for support to culture. The Bolivia Phasing out Programme likewise follows the logic of a gradual departure of human resources.



# 7. Monitoring system

The monitoring system to be defined for the Phasing out Programme will be similar to the system used for the CS 2018-2021. It will, however, be simplified, as the portfolio will only be monitored for two years and the last year will be devoted mainly to ongoing monitoring of the wider context and management of the closeout of the programme and the cooperation office. It is envisaged that the monitoring system will comprise four levels of observation (see Annex 3):

- **Level 1: country context** Systematically identifies possible changes in the context and their expected impact on the programme in order to propose the necessary adjustments. The tools used are MERV and scenario monitoring (conducted twice a year), as well as the Embassy's analytical reports (eg. Political Report, Economic Report, Human Rights Report). Includes monitoring of the press and mainstream and social media. Makes it possible to verify whether or not the main assumptions and predictions for the success of the portfolio have come to pass.
- **Level 2: predicted outcomes of progress made in Bolivia** Monitors the country's progress and expected outcomes, and whether or not country objectives and the contributions made by international cooperation are harmonised.
- **Level 3: expected outcomes and outputs of the Swiss cooperation portfolio** Verifies whether the portfolio is evolving in keeping with the results frameworks for the thematic areas, whether the contributions envisaged are still valid or if it is necessary to review them. Includes ARIs and LACD Gender Action Plan indicators.
- **Level 4: portfolio management** Evaluates whether management is supporting the achievement of results in terms of relationships with stakeholders at different levels, human resources training, learning and knowledge management; the allocation of financial resources; and alignment with national processes. This is based on the following reports: Annual Report and its annex, the Office Management Report (OMR), Internal Control System (ICS) report, and ad hoc financial reports.

The **Annual Reports (2022 and 2023)** will describe key aspects of the phasing out process, such as work with other SDC instruments, transfer to other actors, sustainability and



policy influencing. Likewise, the projects will continue with the CSPM approach in their AWP's and progress reports. They should include specific actions and indicators related to the phasing out process, in order to monitor progress with the implementation of their disengagement and knowledge management strategy.

**Strategic coordination will be maintained with the main development actors who can provide relevant information** for the monitoring of the context, national priorities and the incorporation of the tools, pilot models and innovations developed by the projects into the country's own systems.

**Mid-term evaluations** of ongoing projects (depending on timing and level of priority) are seen as more important than traditional final evaluations. If a final evaluation is to be conducted, it will have to take place no later than one year before the end of the project so that the results can be circulated and used in knowledge management. These evaluations will focus on assessing sustainability, capitalising relevant results, and identifying actions that strengthen the projects in the closeout period.

**A checklist will be drawn up for the phasing out and administrative-financial project closeout processes**, for the purpose of guiding tasks and ensuring that the phasing out is as effective and efficient as possible.

# Annexes

**Annex 1a:** Cooperation Programme scenarios and adaptations

**Annex 1b:** Effects of COVID-19

**Annex 2:** Objectives and outcomes in each thematic area

**Annex 3:** Monitoring system

**Annex 4:** Planned budget 2022 - 2024

**Annex 5:** Acronyms and abbreviations

**Annex 6:** Maps



## Annex 1a: Cooperation Programme scenarios and adaptations

CONFLICT SITUATION		
POSITIVE SCENARIO WITH GOVERNANCE  LIKELIHOOD: 10%	CURRENT/ NEAR FUTURE SCENARIO: DEMOCRATIC BUT WITH GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS  LIKELIHOOD: 70%	SCENARIO WITH MULTIPLE CRISES AND UNGOVERNABILITY  LIKELIHOOD: 20%
POLITICS, HUMAN RIGHTS, SECURITY		
<p><b>Situation:</b> People trust election processes (national and subnational) and accept their results. Elected government (Movement toward Socialism - MAS) with a majority in parliament.</p> <p><b>Hypothesis 1:</b> Forums for dialogue and cooperation between the political forces are established.</p> <p><b>Hypothesis 2:</b> The multi-party system is re-established and includes the MAS, which rebuilds its internal governance and democracy.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The democratically elected national government stabilises the political and social context and deals effectively with the economic and health crisis.</li> <li>• Spaces for political dialogue are opened up, facilitating the work of parliament, government oversight and priority reforms such as justice system reform. Polarisation is reduced.</li> <li>• The judiciary recovers its independence and starts its reform with cross-party support, although it must withstand political pressure in its investigations of human rights abuses and corruption.</li> <li>• The state strengthens its capacity to safeguard rights and builds trust through mechanisms for dialogue with civil society, transparency and accountability, harmony and the culture of peace. There is an agreed mechanism to resolve cases of human rights violations.</li> <li>• Civil society participates in dialogue on policies, public services and conflicts.</li> <li>• The MAS redefines its governance structure, expanding internal democracy and differentiating between its role as a political party and its role in government.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Situation:</b> The results of elections are accepted, but political polarisation persists. Elected government (MAS) with a majority in parliament.</p> <p><b>Hypothesis 1:</b> There is a government with democratic legitimacy but an environment of distrust, lack of dialogue and institutional weakness.</p> <p><b>Hypothesis 2:</b> The party system is weak and dominated by the MAS, which faces internal disputes and a high level of social conflict.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There are no political or legislative agreements between parties. The party in power governs with its parliamentary majority, but important reforms grind to a halt and decisions that require a 2/3 majority in parliament cannot be taken (appointment of high-level authorities, trials of political leaders and constitutional reforms).</li> <li>• Distrust and disputes predominate in politics, in the legislature and in relations between territorial powers. Political and social polarisation prevails and at times becomes extreme. The breakup of the social fabric continues.</li> <li>• The MAS is the dominant force in a fragmented party system. Imposition and confrontation predominate. The parties' institutionality and internal democracy is weak, and formal channels of representation and conflict management are fragile. Leaders emerge outside the traditional parties and uncertainty increases.</li> <li>• There is persistent political interference in the justice system and trials of opposition politicians, with a lack of respect for due process in cases involving political opponents. Transparency and accountability remain weak, enabling acts of corruption. There is a high turnover of public sector staff and public resources are used for party-political purposes.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Situation:</b> There is an elected government (MAS) but it is unstable. There are constant violent conflicts.</p> <p><b>Hypothesis 1:</b> There is constant violent conflict, instability and political volatility. The continuity of the elected government is in doubt. The rule of law is weak and the country is at risk of becoming a fragile state.</p> <p><b>Hypothesis 2:</b> Due to the extreme polarisation and weak party system, there are clashes between the government/MAS and its opponents outside institutional settings and conflicts within the MAS.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Although there is an elected government, there is worsening polarisation, conflict and political paralysis. The state is incapable of resolving the multiple crises.</li> <li>• The government's continuity is challenged. The political struggle takes place outside the institutional framework, in the street, and is characterised by destabilisation and violence.</li> <li>• Social organizations and the MAS become more radical, as does the opposition and its supporters in civil society (civic committees and citizen collectives). The risk of violence between groups of civilians and/or police and military intervention increases.</li> <li>• The conflict between the central government and some autonomous subnational governments intensifies, the conflict over federalisation re-emerges, and there is non-governability at the local level.</li> <li>• There is extreme instability and conflict. The government resorts to authoritarian measures and the use of force, while the opposition engages in violent destabilisation. Human rights violations occur.</li> </ul>

<b>CONFLICT SITUATION</b>		
<b>POSITIVE SCENARIO WITH GOVERNANCE</b>	<b>CURRENT/ NEAR FUTURE SCENARIO: DEMOCRATIC BUT WITH GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS</b>	<b>SCENARIO WITH MULTIPLE CRISES AND UNGOVERNABILITY</b>
<b>LIKELIHOOD: 10%</b>	<b>LIKELIHOOD: 70%</b>	<b>LIKELIHOOD: 20%</b>
<b>POLITICS, HUMAN RIGHTS, SECURITY</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The party system diversifies with new political forces and becomes institutionalised. A moderate multi-party system is consolidated.</li> <li>The efficiency of the work of the state improves, making it possible to run vaccination campaigns, bring an end to the COVID-19 crisis, restart the education system and reactivate the economy. The conditions are in place for starting to adjust the social and economic model and reform the state.</li> <li>Due to the crisis, the level of conflict remains intense, but without placing political stability at risk or leading to unbridled violence.</li> </ul> <p><b>SUBNATIONAL LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subnational elections produce municipal and departmental governments with renewed legitimacy. A multi-party system takes shape at the local level, acting as a counterweight to the predominance of the MAS.</li> <li>Dialogue takes place and coordination is established between the three levels of government to take forward priority actions to address the crisis (vaccination, the tracking of cases or support for producers). Agreements are reached to provide financial resources to subnational governments. Disputes are avoided.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public administration deteriorates, resources are insufficient and coordination to deal with the crisis remains difficult. It is difficult to take forward structural reforms because there is no consensus. This weakens the public's trust in the state and exacerbates conflict.</li> <li>The independence of the judiciary is weak, their decisions are questioned, the functioning of the justice system is flawed and it loses legitimacy.</li> <li>Social conflict intensifies and leads to political clashes, social tension increases, and human rights are weakening. Several sectors of society distrust the state and the entire political system and refuse to engage with it.</li> <li>The treatment of human rights violations by the justice system becomes politicised and it is impossible to arrive at agreements that would make reconciliation possible.</li> </ul> <p><b>SUBNATIONAL LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordination between the three levels of government (central, departmental and municipal) is deficient, there are political and legal disputes between these governments and the conflict over resources intensifies. This makes public management difficult at all levels, and the authorities become discredited.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political disarray and paralysis make a swift and orderly end to the crisis impossible. The post-pandemic period is even more uncertain, the economy becomes even weaker, and the social crisis worsens. Discontent and conflict increase.</li> <li>In the midst of the political crisis, drug trafficking and crime increase in many regions (Chapare, eastern Santa Cruz, the border with Chile, etc).</li> <li>Civil society organisations become weak, practise self-censorship or align with one side or the other in the conflict.</li> </ul> <p><b>SUBNATIONAL LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The political conflict at the national level spreads to the territories. The fight over resources reactivates and regional demands for federalisation of the country become more radical.</li> </ul>
<b>SOCIETY AND THE ECONOMY</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The government reaches political and social agreements which underpin an effective policy to deal with the social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis and reactivate the economy.</li> <li>Resource transfer measures continue. Emergency employment programmes and redistribution policies are implemented to reactivate domestic demand.</li> <li>Measures are agreed to modify the law and support private sector reactivation. Effective programmes are established to support micro and small businesses to protect jobs, adapted to their particular conditions and needs.</li> <li>There is macroeconomic stability, the public deficit is reduced, government spending is reorganised, the level of reserves increases, and a monetary policy that maintains a stable exchange rate and low inflation is implemented. Fuel subsidies are moderate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The government implements policies with scant dialogue or political and social consensus-building. Some of these policies are in response to sectoral lobbying and only prioritise the short term. The implementation of social policies is politicised. The conditions are not in place for taking forward structural reforms.</li> <li>Policy implementation is affected by the conflict and the weakness of the state, reducing its effectiveness. The way out of the socioeconomic crisis is convoluted. New waves of infection and the vaccination campaign are managed in a disorderly way. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The economy is slow to get back to normal, the recession is prolonged, and income and employment levels do not recover. There is an increase in poverty and inequality, food security is fragile, and employment becomes increasingly insecure. The size of the informal sector increases, and microenterprises and small-scale producers are seriously affected. Social policies suffer a setback, basic services deteriorate, and disparities in health and education widen.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Disorder and ungovernability makes it impossible to implement public policies and the state is unable to solve almost any problem.</li> <li>Due to the impossibility of implementing policies to tackle the health emergency and reactivate the economy, the socioeconomic situation deteriorates.</li> <li>The economy collapses and the financial system experiences an acute crisis. Production, especially by small-scale producers, is seriously damaged, and access to education and health services deteriorates. There is a rise in COVID-19 infections, the vaccination campaign grinds to a halt, and food security is weakened. This culminates in a strong increase in poverty and inequality, the middle class is impoverished, and people are forced to migrate.</li> <li>The progress made in wellbeing, development and levels of schooling goes into reverse.</li> </ul>

<b>CONFLICT SITUATION</b>		
<b>POSITIVE SCENARIO WITH GOVERNANCE</b>	<b>CURRENT/ NEAR FUTURE SCENARIO: DEMOCRATIC BUT WITH GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS</b>	<b>SCENARIO WITH MULTIPLE CRISES AND UNGOVERNABILITY</b>
<b>LIKELIHOOD: 10%</b>	<b>LIKELIHOOD: 70%</b>	<b>LIKELIHOOD: 20%</b>
<b>SOCIETY AND THE ECONOMY</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>External financing is obtained under favourable conditions to deal with the post-pandemic recovery period.</li> <li>Vaccination and new COVID infections are well managed and there is a return to in-classroom or hybrid education.</li> <li>Large losses of income and further increases in poverty and inequality are avoided.</li> <li>Agreed reforms are launched to redirect the socioeconomic model towards greater diversification of the economy, good quality employment and the development of medium, small and micro enterprises. The conditions are favourable for an increase in private investment and private sector participation in the economy.</li> </ul> <p><b>SUBNATIONAL LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preliminary agreements are reached for a fiscal pact. Local governments are consulted and treated as partners in the implementation of social and economic measures to overcome the crisis. The autonomous subnational governments increase the revenue they raise themselves.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, state revenues fall and it is difficult to fund policies to tackle the crisis. Access to foreign borrowing to finance the government deficit becomes critical. The negotiation of new external financing (from the IMF, multilateral banks or selling government bonds to private investors) is complicated and politicised.</li> <li>It is difficult to implement policies due to the lack of capacity and the shortage of funds, especially in the case of programmes to support MSEs, as their needs are not taken into account. The financial system deteriorates due to increased risk and arrears. Investment in state-owned enterprises is not efficient.</li> <li>Difficulties and conflicts hamper the implementation of policies and projects in indigenous territories.</li> </ul> <p><b>SUBNATIONAL LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There are deeper cuts in transfers to subnational governments (IDH revenue and their share of national tax revenue) and a fall in the revenue they raise themselves. Conflicts over income are reactivated and investments by subnational governments fall.</li> <li>The lack of coordination between central and subnational governments hampers the implementation of health and socioeconomic policies. The state maintains its centralising tendency.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Due to the impossibility of adopting measures, macroeconomic conditions become unstable: the currency is devalued, inflation increases, the state has to resort to emergency external support, and this borrowing is criticised by both the government and the opposition. Foreign and private investment grinds to a halt. There is an increase in contraband and drug trafficking. The economic crisis is practically systemic and the human cost is high.</li> </ul> <p><b>SUBNATIONAL LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The fiscal and economic crisis also affects subnational governments. Their revenue falls and they are unable even to finance their day-to-day operations.</li> </ul>
<b>ENVIRONMENT</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political and social agreements are reached to take forward a policy to protect the environment and respond to climate change. The sector's institutional status and policies on protected areas, forests and controlling deforestation for farming are strengthened.</li> <li>Social and environmental management of extractive projects improves and a sustainable diversification of agriculture is promoted. The law on the production and use of genetically modified seeds is analysed and agreements are reached with society to regulate it. National productive strategy takes biodiversity conservation into account.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environment and climate change issues are seen as a less important priority for the state, and attention is only paid to emergencies, not structural problems. Policies on the environment are maintained but no progress is made and their implementation is characterised by inefficiency.</li> <li>To speed up the reactivation post-pandemic, extractive projects (in mining, fossil fuels or intensive agriculture) that show little respect for the environment are encouraged. Environmental conflicts (Tarquia, Tipnis, Bala) continue unresolved. The production and use of GM seeds becomes consolidated and affects the farming sector in terms of biodiversity maintenance, soil quality and the appearance of pests.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In the midst of the political conflict, the environment is not a political priority, with serious implications for resilience to climate change and a strong negative impact on issues such as water sources, air quality, biodiversity and others.</li> <li>Policy decisions are taken that go against environmental protection and climate change reduction, such as allowing uncontrolled extractive activities that affect water, air and soil quality.</li> <li>Deforestation increases, as do uncontrolled forest fires.</li> <li>Protected areas are seriously affected by human interventions and natural disasters due to climate change.</li> </ul>

## CONFLICT SITUATION

<b>POSITIVE SCENARIO WITH GOVERNANCE</b>  <b>LIKELIHOOD: 10%</b>	<b>CURRENT/ NEAR FUTURE SCENARIO: DEMOCRATIC BUT WITH GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS</b>  <b>LIKELIHOOD: 70%</b>	<b>SCENARIO WITH MULTIPLE CRISES AND UNGOVERNABILITY</b>  <b>LIKELIHOOD: 20%</b>
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### ENVIRONMENT

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A connection is established between the response to COVID-19 and protecting the environment, in areas such as the management of water and solid waste and environmentally responsible production.</li> <li>Citizens are involved in the design and implementation of environmental policies.</li> <li>Opportunities for cooperation are taken advantage of. The new European Green Deal strategy contributes to the new PDES. The international agenda on climate change is taken up once again, progress is made on measuring the NDC (Nationally Determined Contributions) and the country is able to access funds from the Green Climate Fund.</li> <li>A structural response to the problem of forest fires and burning is developed and the legislation on disaster risk reduction is applied sectorally and regionally.</li> <li>Environmental and climate change issues are mainstreamed and activated at different levels of financial and operational investment in the public and private sector.</li> <li>Fragile ecosystems are declared and conserved. Forests, wetlands and fragile high mountain areas are protected and strategies are developed to promote sustainable use and restoration.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No progress is made on meeting the commitments in the international climate change agenda and there is no access to financial resources.</li> <li>Conflicts and a lack of investment affect the capacity of municipal governments to provide adequate services (water, rubbish collection), with negative effects on the control of COVID-19 and other diseases.</li> <li>The risk of forest fires caused by human actions continue to be high in the eastern region of the country (Chiquitania, Amazon region, Mesothermal Valleys). Laws and regulations are not properly enforced.</li> <li>Less attention is paid to early warning systems and disaster risk reduction, and vulnerability to climate change increases as a result. Protected areas are affected both by human interventions and by natural disasters.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The political crisis facilitates the spread of illicit activities that exploit natural resources and have a negative impact on the environment (illegal mining, coca growing, deforestation, etc).</li> <li>Rampant conflict and the deterioration in public services affects waste disposal or water supply systems, with serious consequences for people's health.</li> </ul>
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### SPACE FOR DEVELOPMENT

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The country has a new Development Plan, adapted to the context and the resources available, which can be supported by international cooperation. A coherent vision of sustainable development takes shape, in which there is a role for many social actors who share responsibility.</li> <li>There is a better relationship and policy dialogue between state institutions and cooperation agencies, including on sensitive issues (such as civil society, respect for human rights and governance).</li> <li>As part of the economic reactivation programme, there is space for cooperation agencies to advocate for inclusive approaches, sustainable development, the circular economy, triple impact (environmental, economic and social), innovation and other issues</li> <li>Possibility to cooperate on issues related to COVID-19 and its consequences: in education, rights, production, market development and institutional strengthening.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Less space for dialogue and cooperation with the government. There is a climate of distrust. The Development Plan is unrealistic, centralised, and not in tune with the budget required or the needs of sectors and regions.</li> <li>The government distrusts foreign cooperation organisations. Limited possibility for cooperating on sensitive and urgent issues such as the health situation, economic recovery or human rights.</li> <li>It is possible to support the implementation of some public policies, but only with extensive policy dialogue with the government by donors (or on their behalf).</li> <li>There is limited space to work with civil society at the national level.</li> <li>High turnover of staff in the public sector due to political instability causes difficulties for cooperation agencies' relationships and effectiveness.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Little or no space to take forward participatory, multi-stakeholder, inclusive and sustainable development work. There is no medium-term development vision in the government or among political actors.</li> <li>Public policies are opportunistic and aimed at generating revenue for the state (extractive industries are given priority).</li> <li>Cooperation organisations are unable to work on some sensitive issues (human rights, mediation, etc) and prefer to concentrate on small-scale projects in non-conflictive areas (agricultural production, natural disasters, etc).</li> <li>Policy dialogue with the donor community is suspended or cut off entirely.</li> <li>Political instability, constant changes in public administration's priorities and the high turnover of staff discourage cooperation work.</li> </ul>
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<b>CONFLICT SITUATION</b>		
<b>POSITIVE SCENARIO WITH GOVERNANCE</b>  <b>LIKELIHOOD: 10%</b>	<b>CURRENT/ NEAR FUTURE SCENARIO: DEMOCRATIC BUT WITH GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS</b>  <b>LIKELIHOOD: 70%</b>	<b>SCENARIO WITH MULTIPLE CRISES AND UNGOVERNABILITY</b>  <b>LIKELIHOOD: 20%</b>
<b>SPACE FOR DEVELOPMENT</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advocacy on public policies by donors (or on their behalf) is better coordinated.</li> <li>• Mechanisms/platforms are in place for civil society to influence, supervise and participate in community actions to address the health crisis, environmental management, production systems and other development issues.</li> <li>• Increased dialogue and cooperation between central government and subnational levels provides opportunities for better planning and delivery of public services in the territories.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Excessive centralisation, fragile exercise of subnational powers, and weak updating of the planning system makes cooperation with the departmental and municipal level difficult.</li> <li>• Conflicts between highland and lowland indigenous peoples makes it difficult to move forward with indigenous autonomies, the sustainable use of their territories, and improving their living conditions.</li> <li>• Lack of financial resources due to the economic crisis makes it difficult to obtain counterpart contributions for investment and cooperation projects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Several traditional donors have to withdraw from the country. New external players increase their involvement.</li> </ul>
<b>CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COOPERATION PROGRAMME IN THE SHORT TERM (December 2021)</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relations with the government are resumed so that the Cooperation Programme can continue.</li> <li>• Should implementation difficulties arise, the programme will be revised with changes to take effect immediately and a more far-reaching adjustment in some projects or the return of funds (August).</li> <li>• This will have to be combined with an analysis of responsible project phase out, depending on the progress achieved and future sustainability and impacts.</li> <li>• The CSPM approach and the cross-cutting theme of governance are used to closely monitor the context.</li> <li>• Portfolio reprogramming is under way and is helping to reduce the impact of the crisis on the communities supported by SDC with prevention measures in health, economic recovery, access to justice services and the campaign against violence against women.</li> <li>• Ongoing measures are in place to mitigate the constraints of online working and maintain the team spirit and overall motivation.</li> <li>• Plan actions for the effective and responsible closeout of projects in the area of governance in 2022.</li> <li>• Measures are in place to ensure employment continuity for the Embassy team.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contact with the government is resumed with a view to continuing with the Cooperation Programme, taking into account situation, political and context risks.</li> <li>• Should implementation difficulties arise, the programme will be revised with changes to take effect immediately and a more far-reaching adjustment in some projects or the return of funds (August).</li> <li>• This will have to be combined with an analysis of responsible project closeout, depending on the progress achieved and future sustainability and impacts. The CSPM approach and the cross-cutting theme of governance are used to closely monitor the context.</li> <li>• The new context for working in the political, economic and social scenario that has taken shape following the election of national and subnational authorities is being analysed.</li> <li>• Reinforce information-sharing and coordination with other donors and diplomatic missions.</li> <li>• Assess the need to adopt additional measures to mitigate the constraints of online working and think about the measures required for the gradual return to working in the office. Identify measures to maintain the team spirit and overall motivation, taking into account measures that may be required to continue working in a scenario of political and social conflict and a persistent health crisis.</li> <li>• Plan actions for the effective and responsible closeout of projects in the area of governance in 2022. Governance will be maintained as a cross-cutting theme until 2024.</li> <li>• Assess the need to adapt the Employment Continuity Plan and job security measures.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decisions will be taken about the continuity of the work, depending on the risks in the context and the conditions for dialogue and seeking alternatives.</li> <li>• Efforts to ensure responsible project closeout will be maintained as far as possible, depending on the progress achieved and future sustainability and impacts.</li> <li>• The CSPM approach and the cross-cutting theme of governance are used to closely monitor the context.</li> <li>• Analyse measures to be adopted in the portfolio, given a scenario of deepening economic crisis (currency devaluation, unemployment, recession).</li> <li>• Adopt new measures to continue working in a scenario of serious political and social conflict and a persistent health crisis.</li> <li>• Assess the need to adapt the Employment Continuity Plan, job security measures and ways to improve the employment situation in this significantly worse context</li> </ul>

## CONFLICT SITUATION

<b>POSITIVE SCENARIO WITH GOVERNANCE</b>  <b>LIKELIHOOD: 10%</b>	<b>CURRENT/ NEAR FUTURE SCENARIO: DEMOCRATIC BUT WITH GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS</b>  <b>LIKELIHOOD: 70%</b>	<b>SCENARIO WITH MULTIPLE CRISES AND UNGOVERNABILITY</b>  <b>LIKELIHOOD: 20%</b>
<b>CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COOPERATION PROGRAMME IN THE MEDIUM TERM (2022) AND LONG TERM (2024)</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continue to apply the CSPM approach.</li> <li>Design of the phasing out programme takes into account the effects of COVID-19 and the multiple crises (political, social and economic), enabling the results of the portfolio to be consolidated.</li> <li>Move ahead with a responsible and sustainable phasing out. The closeout process is planned in a moderately favourable context in both the public sector, the private sector and civil society for anchoring sustainable models and interventions.</li> <li>Flexibility is built in so that the programme can be adapted in its final years of implementation.</li> <li>Opportunity to work on forging links with the public sector, civil society and the private sector, in an environment of greater acceptance and influence.</li> <li>Conditions in the surrounding environment allow advocacy for the continuity and increased involvement of the global programmes, humanitarian aid with disaster risk reduction (DRR) projects and SECO.</li> <li>KM is fully implemented with the participation of staff / peer to peer, partners, donors and regional and thematic SDC networks.</li> <li>Significant progress is made on commitments related to the environment and respect for Mother Earth in the region, together with Peru and Ecuador.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen the CSPM approach.</li> <li>Design of the phasing out programme takes into account the effects of COVID-19 and the multiple crises (political, social and economic), enabling the results of the portfolio to be consolidated.</li> <li>Significant efforts are made to implement the phasing out programme in its different modalities.</li> <li>Conditions in the surrounding environment and political will are good enough to advocate for the continuity and increased involvement of the global programmes, humanitarian aid with disaster risk reduction (DRR) projects and SECO.</li> <li>As a result of the impossibility of taking forward the work due to weak technical capacities or the lack of political will in the state, the implementation of some projects has to be rescheduled once again.</li> <li>The financial plan is regularly adjusted to take into account factors such as currency devaluation, inflation, and other consequences of economic instability.</li> <li>Look for alliances and funding from third parties to ensure a responsible phasing out approach.</li> <li>KM is implemented with the participation of staff / peer to peer, priority partners, donors and regional and thematic SDC networks.</li> <li>Coordination with other donors and efforts to engage in dialogue with the state.</li> <li>A more in-depth analysis of economic policy will be required. This should lead to focusing solely on areas of work with the potential to achieve concrete and demonstrable results that can be transferred to the country.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The CSPM approach is essential.</li> <li>Redefine the type of diplomatic relationship that Switzerland will have with the country and the interests (cooperation) that will be maintained in this context.</li> <li>Analyse the closeout of some projects earlier than predicted.</li> <li>Humanitarian aid programmes will be needed.</li> <li>A scaled-down programme and reorientation of the budget with strategic partners to promote stability and ensure that results are achieved.</li> <li>Scaled-down KM actions are implemented, seeking opportunities for the participation of staff / peer to peer, priority partners, donors and regional and thematic SDC networks.</li> <li>Coordination with other donors and dialogue with the state are limited, with self-censorship.</li> <li>Possibility that qualified staff leave before the end of the phasing out.</li> </ul>



## Annex 1b: Effects of COVID-19

Effects COVID-19	Impact on projects	Mitigation measures
<b>Restrictions on movement due to the risk of infection (new variant) affect the reactivation of economic and productive activities and the provision of services</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Constraints in supply chains, production, processing and marketing.</li> <li>• Closure of schools, courts and conciliation centres.</li> <li>• Limited attention in public institutions.</li> <li>• Education, sales and financial system processes go online.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Delays and less time to implement processes and activities.</li> <li>• Less political will among state actors (national and subnational) because they are prioritising the health crisis.</li> <li>• Coordination with counterparts is difficult.</li> <li>• Opportunity to move forward with online processes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop and strengthen the capacities of project staff and institutional and community partners to use online tools for online working.</li> <li>• Promote the implementation of measures to reduce the risk of infection.</li> <li>• Reinforce online supervision/monitoring mechanisms, with greater involvement of local stakeholders in overseeing progress, overcoming connectivity constraints.</li> <li>• Strengthen/develop new alliances with state authorities, community representatives and private companies.</li> <li>• Strengthen the links between producers and buyers.</li> <li>• Support the digitalisation of financial procedures.</li> </ul>
<b>Lower economic growth</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fall in public and private investment.</li> <li>• The government budget focuses on addressing health issues.</li> <li>• Reduction in people's income.</li> <li>• Increased demand for funding.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Less ability to leverage funds.</li> <li>• Smaller state counterpart contribution to projects.</li> <li>• Increased demand for loans.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote increased involvement of stakeholders to maintain services.</li> <li>• Keep the issues on the public agenda by working with civil society, the media and the international community.</li> </ul>
<b>Increase in unemployment, with knock-on effects on poverty and inequality</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Young people and women are worst affected.</li> <li>• Closure or downsizing of family businesses and MSEs.</li> <li>• Escalation in violence against women.</li> <li>• Students (especially girls) drop out of education due to financial problems and increased caring responsibilities.</li> <li>• Deterioration in productive capacities and human skills.</li> <li>• Emergence of new productive and economic initiatives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The achievement of project results/impacts is delayed or limited.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen young people, women and institutional and social actors in the systems in which the projects are working to counteract the effects.</li> <li>• Timely measures to stop violence from escalating and avoid students dropping out of education.</li> </ul>
<b>Prioritisation of certain issues on the public agenda and increased awareness among citizens</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Importance of access to water and hygiene, basic services such as rubbish collection, water resources and waste management, and valuing of the work of rubbish collection.</li> <li>• Job opportunities for people with different abilities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Favourable context for some projects that work on these issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote links between urban and rural territories to take the projects forward.</li> <li>• Strengthen communication to take this new public agenda to a wider audience.</li> </ul>

## Annex 2: Objectives and outcomes in each thematic area

<b>Portfolio Outcome 1: Governance</b> Contribution to IC Strategy 2021-2024 sub-objective: 9+10		
<p><b>Theory of Change description:</b></p> <p>If the advocacy, scaling up and replication actions are consolidated, together with enhanced capacity development and the transfer of good practices to state and civil society stakeholders in the campaign against violence and for access to justice, increased empowerment of people in a situation of vulnerability will be promoted and the capacities of counterparts will be strengthened, as will synergies with other donors, leading to shared responsibility and collaborative work between the state and civil society (linking up with universities and the private sector), which will contribute to the exercise of rights and advocacy on policies.</p> <p><b>Thematic area objective:</b></p> <p>Actions to ensure the continuity of the work of access to justice services and the campaign against violence against women are consolidated and forums are promoted for inclusive and constructive dialogue between the state and civil society.</p>		
(1) Swiss Portfolio Outcomes	(2) Swiss programme contribution	(3) Partner country humanitarian or development outcomes
<p><b>Outcome 1:</b></p> <p>Actions to ensure the continuity of the work of access to justice services and the campaign against violence against women are consolidated.</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.1:</b></p> <p>The justice sector and civil society take action to consolidate, demand enforcement and share responsibility for the continuity of the access to justice services (conciliation, state legal aid and advice) and the campaign against violence.</p> <p><b>Baseline (June 2021):</b> 1 national government policy (on neighbourhood and community networks - LwV).</p> <p><b>Target (December 2022):</b> 7 public policies, legislation and other actions.</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.2:</b></p> <p>Number of women in a situation of violence who have received integrated support and protection services (GEN_ARI_1).</p> <p><b>Baseline (June 2021):</b> 29.400 women in a situation of violence.</p> <p><b>Target (December 2022):</b> 40.000 women in a situation of violence.</p>	<p>The work to consolidate actions with both the state and civil society, together with an effective relationship with civil society actors interested in access to justice and gender-based violence issues, moves forward and manages to influence the phasing down and over (alliances with other donors), securing contributions and commitments to continue this work, which increases the likelihood of better access to public services</p> <p><b>Assumptions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key stakeholders (champions) are interested in and carry out actions to promote the continuity of the access to justice services, leading to a responsible phasing down.</li> <li>• The partial reform of Laws 1173 and 348 (shortening of the trial process and AAV) is finalised in 2021 and advocacy work is done with decision-makers and authorities for the phasing down, which is favourable for the continuity of the services.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The reduction in government revenue has a negative impact on the delivery of public justice and AAV services.</li> <li>• The effects of the pandemic continue, affecting the regular provision of services.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Indicator 1.1 (PDES 7.1.3.1):</b></p> <p>Percentage of reform progress based on regulatory development and public policies.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 0%.</p> <p><b>Target (2025):</b> 100%.</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.2 (PDES 7.3.2.1):</b></p> <p>Percentage of sentences with respect to trials initiated for feminicides.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 11%.</p> <p><b>Target (2025):</b> 35%.</p>
<p><b>Outcome 2:</b></p> <p>State institutions and civil society organisations move towards the practice of shared responsibility, based on collaborative dialogue on key issues for inclusive development.</p>	<p>The parallel strengthening of state institutions (at the national, departmental and municipal level) and civil society organisations (CSOs), together with the definition of clear priorities in state development planning and international commitments (Sustainable Development Goals - SDGs), lead to a climate of openness and a common language on key development issues.</p> <p>The sharing of successful experiences, good practices, key data and research (evidence) in different public and private sector settings contributes to shared responsibility and collaborative work by the state and CSOs.</p>	<p><b>Outcome 2:</b></p> <p>Favourable environment for the contributions and work of civil society organisations (CSOs) as development actors.</p>

<p><b>Indicator 2.1:</b> Number of civil society organisations that feel that state institutions (at the national, departmental and municipal level) take their proposals into account and involve them in discussion processes and, eventually, in joint measures to address key development issues in the country, based on timely information. <b>Baseline (June 2021):</b> 21 CSOs. <b>Target (December 2023):</b> 40 CSOs.</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.2:</b> Number of evidence-based proposed solutions to key development issues / public policy priorities developed by NGOs and/or NGO networks as a result of collaborative democratic dialogue with civil society, the state, academia and the private sector. <b>Baseline (June 2021):</b> 19 proposals. <b>Target (December 2023):</b> 44 CSO proposals.</p>	<p><b>Assumptions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State actors (at the national, departmental and municipal level) are open to sharing responsibility and working together with civil society on service delivery.</li> <li>• Civil society actors are actively committed to improve service delivery under the principle of shared responsibility and use the knowledge gained from the thematic and organisational strengthening support.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In a politicised and polarised context, the relationship between the government and CSOs becomes tenser, reducing opportunities for joint work on the structural issues affecting the country.</li> <li>• In response to the position taken by CSOs and the evidence and demands they present, there is a tense atmosphere and the government hardens its position. The central government once again acts to censor and tighten control over the work of civil society with the intention of imposing its own agenda, leading to self-censorship among CSOs.</li> <li>• The reduction in fiscal transfers (financial resources) to the subnational level, the cuts in government budgets and the indebtedness of municipal governments may hamper advocacy processes and collaborative work with CSOs to share responsibility for service delivery.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Indicator 2.1 (proxy indicator):</b> Number of NGOs, foundations and NGO networks included in the Single National Register of NGOs (RUNO) managed by the Vice-Ministry of Public Investment and External Financing (VIPFE). <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 120 CSOs. <b>Target (2023):</b> no state target.</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.2 (PDES 7.1.8.1):</b> Annual report on the interaction between civil society and the central government to inform, disseminate and promote inclusive and pluralistic policies. <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 0. <b>Target (2025):</b> 5.</p>
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#### (4) Lines of intervention (Swiss programme)

- Development of the institutional capacities of CSOs and counterpart institutions.
- Strengthening of collaborative dialogue to preserve the democratic system and the rule of law and the exercise of citizens' rights.
- Increased inclusion of CSOs and citizens in development processes at the local and national level.
- Promotion of studies and research that produce evidence for an informed dialogue on priority policies on an equal footing.
- Implementation of the urban and urban/rural approach (rural-urban links and the impact of migration) in specific actions and the sharing of results.
- Emphasis on communication for development (multimedia production and broadcasting on social media and radio), which enables issues to be placed on the agenda and generates multiplier effects (replication of good practices).
- Work with Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to reduce the digital gap. For example, projects include ICTs in their work with stakeholders, training and online courses to promote equity in access to ICTs.

#### (5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss programme)

Financial resources: CHF 1.100.000

There are counterpart contributions from state institutions, universities and civil society to implement the projects, in the form of both financial resources and in-kind contributions.

Modalities: a) mandate for CDS and LwV, b) AJ: mixed administration: Fundación UNIR mandate (for work with CSOs and municipal governments) and direct administration (for work with state institutions) through the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) (3 collaborators).

Strategic partners and alliances with other donors: Sweden and possibly Spain; enquiries will be made with the EU on justice services and other actors such as CSOs. The priority counterparts are the institutions in the justice sector: the judiciary, Public Prosecution Service, Ministry of Justice and organisations specialising in justice and conciliation services; as well as civil society organisations more broadly (CDS).

#### (6) Management results/performance, including indicators (Swiss programme)

- The principles of governance (with an emphasis on accountability and the rule of law), shared responsibility and the gender approach are promoted in the treatment of public policies.
- Projects in this thematic area complete their operational phase satisfactorily: Access to Justice - AJ (April 2022), Life without Violence - LwV (June 2002), and CDS in December 2023.
- Accordingly, the Swiss programme indicators will be measured in 2022 for AJ and LwV. In the case of CDS, the indicators will be measured in 2023.
- The three projects in this thematic area have implemented their Knowledge Management (KM) strategies; in the justice sector, KM will be done in the first four months of 2022, and the main instruments, outputs and good practices, both for AJ and LwV, will be transferred to state institutions and civil society (phasing down) in the second half of 2022.
- Alliances are forged with like-minded donors (Sweden) in 2021/2022, with transfers (phasing over) of the LwV and CDS projects.
- Approaches to donors in the International Justice Group to discuss potential alliances on the work involved in the AJ project (with an emphasis on conciliation) produce results that enhance anchoring and continuity.

<b>Portfolio Outcome 2: Economic Development</b> Contribution to IC Strategy 2021-2024 sub-objective: 1+2		
<p><b>Theory of Change description:</b>            If projects in the area of economic development help to strengthen education services, non-financial services and financial services, and to improve the skills and access of young people, workers, microenterprises and rural businesses, with an emphasis on women and vulnerable groups, they will maintain, recover and increase their jobs, self-employment and income, as well as their economic and social inclusion and resilience.</p> <p><b>Thematic area objective:</b>            Economic and productive development with increased economic, social and environmental inclusion, equity and resilience among groups with the potential to overcome poverty.</p>		
(1) Swiss Portfolio Outcomes	(2) Swiss programme contribution	(3) Partner country humanitarian or development outcomes
<p><b>Outcome 1:</b>            People, especially young people and women, have maintained/improved/found jobs/self-employment as a result of having access to technical and vocational education and training and financial and non-financial services.</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.1a:</b>            Number of young people (aged 15-24) and adults who were given training and were able to develop better occupational skills (IED_ARI_1).  <b>Baseline (2021):</b> 11.382 graduates/24.000 participants (56% women; 33% young people).  <b>Target (2023):</b> An additional 10.500 graduates/22.000 participants (50% women; 70% young people).</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.1b:</b>            Number of people with competency certification from the Plurinational Competency Certification System (SPCC).  <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 19.504 people certified.  <b>Target (2023):</b> 6.000 additional people certified.</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.2:</b>            Number of young people and adults who access and use formal financial and non-financial services (IED_ARI_3).  <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 92.350 (54% women).  <b>Target (2023):</b> 23.587 (38% women).</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.3:</b>            Number of young people and adults who kept or found a better-paid job or self-employment (IED_ARI_2).  <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 37.547 (37% women; the figure for young people is not available).  <b>Target (2023):</b> 22.382 (40% women; 40% young people).</p>	<p>Access to technical and vocational education and training and consolidated financial and non-financial services will provide young people with better opportunities to find a job/self-employment and will enable adults to keep or improve their jobs/self-employment.</p> <p><b>Assumption</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Swiss contribution focuses on skills development and the strengthening of service providers, with an indirect impact on employment and income.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The economic crisis caused by the pandemic and political instability affect the performance of markets in the country.</li> <li>Constraints in laws and regulations and the difficulty of adapting them to make them more flexible means that they do not support innovation and the adoption of technologies, especially in terms of digitalisation.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outcome 1:</b>            Education, research, science and technology for the strengthening and development of productive capacities and potentialities (Axis 5, Goal 5.1.1 and Goal 5.2.1, PDES 2021-2025).</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.1 (PDES 5.1.1.2):</b>            Enrollment rate in higher education of the population aged 19 to 23.  <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 43.60% of young people aged 19 to 23 are enrolled.  <b>Target (2025):</b> 53.76% of young people aged between 19 to 23 are enrolled.</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.2 (PDES 5.2.1.1):</b>            Matriculated persons 15 years of age and older in Alternative Technical Education (ATE).  <b>Baseline (2021):</b> 98.100.  <b>Target (2025):</b> 130.400.</p> <p><b>Outcome 2:</b>            Rebuilding the economy, regaining macroeconomic and social stability (Axis 1, Goal 1.1.3 and Goal 1.4.3, PDES 2021-2025).</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.1 (PDES 1.1.3.1):</b>            Percentage of the total portfolio allocated to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the productive sector and up to 10% of loans for low-income housing.  <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 57,04% MSME Banking.  <b>Target (2025):</b> Greater than or equal to 50% MSME Banking.</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.2 (PDES 1.4.3.1):</b>            Unemployment rate, urban area.  <b>Baseline (2021):</b> 8.4% unemployment rate.  <b>Target (2025):</b> 4.5% unemployment rate.</p>

<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Businesses that have received support use the skills they have gained to improve their productivity and access to markets.</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.1:</b> Percentage annual increase in: a) yield of a specific crop (kg/ha) produced by the small-scale farmers supported; b) the productivity of business units in urban areas (micro and small enterprises - MSEs).</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> a) Potato crop: 2.148 kg/ha; b) 5.834 per employee per year.</p> <p><b>Target (2023):</b> a) 2.234 kg/ha; b) 6.418 per employee per year (10% increase).</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.2:</b> Increase in the sales volume of: a) MSEs and b) family farms.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2021):</b> a) USD 16.704 per MSE per year.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> b) USD 903 per farm per year.</p> <p><b>Target (2023):</b> a) USD 17.756 per MSE per year (6.3%); b) USD per farm per year (figure not available).</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.3:</b> Number of businesses that have increased their net income in: a) agriculture (crops) (AFS_ARI_1), b) micro, small and medium enterprises.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> a) 13.685 for farms; b) 2.419 for MSEs.</p> <p><b>Target (2023):</b> a) 1.885 for farms; b) 1.920 for MSEs.</p>	<p>Integrated and systemic services help to maintain or improve the productivity of the urban and rural businesses and of the people trained, as well as their income.</p> <p><b>Assumption</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Service providers in both the public and the private sector have been strengthened and their services are sustainable.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cuts in public funding may affect investments in technical and vocational education and training, as well as services for urban and rural businesses.</li> <li>Adverse factors such as contraband and the competition from lower-priced products from abroad limit the involvement of rural businesses and urban MSEs in domestic markets.</li> <li>Climate change may have a negative impact on the availability of natural resources and inputs.</li> <li>The economic crisis caused by the pandemic and political instability affect the performance of markets in the country.</li> <li>The effectiveness of public policies to promote family agriculture is limited.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Food security with sovereignty, promotion of value-added exports and tourism development (Axis 3, Goal 3.2.11, Target 3.2.5, PDES 2021-2025).</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.1 (PDES 3.2.11.1):</b> Potato production (in metric tons per hectare).</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 7.5 metric tons/hectares.</p> <p><b>Target (2025):</b> 32 metric tons/hectares.</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.2 (PDES 3.2.11.3):</b> Agricultural production (vegetables, fruits, tubers, grains...) of family farming (millions of metric tons).</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 6.7 millions of metric tons.</p> <p><b>Target (2025):</b> 10 millions of metric tons.</p> <p><b>Outcome 4:</b> Industrialization with import substitution (Axis 2, Goal 2.1.1, PDES 2021-2025).</p> <p><b>Indicator 4.1 (PDES 2.1.1.1):</b> Percentage of progress in import substitution of consumer food products, pharmaceuticals, textiles, fuels, production inputs and inputs for agriculture and industry.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 0%.</p> <p><b>Target (2025):</b> 47%.</p>
<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Stronger education and training providers, suppliers of goods and inputs, and providers of financial and non-financial services provide good quality services in the priority territories and sectors.</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.1:</b> Quality rating due to improvements in the implementation of plans, services, methodologies and innovations.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 86%.</p> <p><b>Target (2023):</b> Improvement.</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.2:</b> Percentage of funding from Bolivian public and private sources to provide the services supported by Swiss cooperation..</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> USD 12.310.568 (45%).</p> <p><b>Target (2023):</b> 40%.</p>	<p>The Ministry of Education, Ministry of Productive Development and the Plural Economy (MDPyEP) and Ministry of Rural Development and Lands (MDRYT), as well as private service providers who have been strengthened and are making use of innovations, improve access to education, training and financial and non-financial services.</p> <p><b>Assumption</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The ministries are open to dialogue with the private sector and civil society to meet people's needs.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cuts in public funding may affect the continuity of service delivery and reduce investment in technical and vocational education and training and in urban and rural businesses.</li> <li>The government's strategies to diversify production, focusing on state-owned enterprises only, act as a constraint on business development in the country.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outcome 5:</b> Education, research, science and technology for the strengthening and development of productive capacities and potential (Axis 5, Goal 5.4.3 PDES 2021-2025).</p> <p><b>Indicator 5.1 (PDES 5.4.3.2):</b> Implementation of the national platform for user and consumer defense and supplier quality.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 0%.</p> <p><b>Target (2025):</b> 47%.</p>

<p><b>(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss programme)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consolidation of the achievements in technical and vocational education and training, with an emphasis on transfer to the Ministry of Education and private sector involvement.</li> <li>• Consolidation of inclusive business models, using the Market Systems Development (MSD) approach to achieve critical mass and sustainability.</li> <li>• Increasing the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises, as well as facilitating access to export markets, seeking synergies between SDC and SECO.</li> <li>• Making links between the different projects in the thematic area and public and private financial services, contributing to the funding (leverage of financial resources) and sustainability of the work, including opportunities with SIFEM.</li> <li>• Development and promotion of digitalisation in the provision of education, financial and non-financial services.</li> </ul>
<p><b>(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss programme)</b></p> <p><u>Financial resources:</u> CHF 9.310.000</p> <p><u>Modalities:</u> mandates (technical and vocational education and training); contributions to public institutions: ministries, Productive Development Bank (BDP); delegation to other cooperation agencies; contributions to private organisations (Fundación PROFIN); alliances with the private sector (Engagement with the Private Sector - EPS) and triangular cooperation.</p> <p><u>Strategic partners:</u> a) Government: Ministry of Education, Ministry of Productive Development and the Plural Economy, Ministry of Rural Development and Lands; departmental and municipal governments in the areas where the programme is working; and BDP. b) Private sector: chambers of commerce and industry, education and training institutes, companies, financial institutions and service providers. c) NGOs: Fundación PROFIN and other project partners. d) Cooperation agencies: IDB, ILO, UNDP, and Swedish Cooperation (SIDA).</p>
<p><b>(6) Management results/performance, including indicators (Swiss programme)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue with the cross-cutting approaches of governance, CSPM and gender, with differentiated strategies and affirmative actions. Environmental and climate change issues will also be taken into account in production projects.</li> <li>• The main milestones are: implementation of the technical and vocational Education and Training project addendum and start of the phasing out of the Inclusive Markets project.</li> <li>• The projects in this thematic area are completed satisfactorily, with an emphasis on the consolidation of services (education, insurance, financial, technical assistance services), and the main approaches of phasing out (Seed Capital 2023; PROMYPE 2022, technical and vocational Education and Training<sup>1</sup>); phasing down (Inclusive Insurance 2022); phasing over (Inclusive Markets 2022).</li> <li>• Knowledge Management (KM) is implemented for the projects, with the aim of transferring learning, models and tools, and influencing public and private sector stakeholders and civil society.</li> <li>• The main KM outputs are disseminated: credit system for entrepreneurs and innovators; methodological outputs for the combined implementation of the Multidimensional Poverty and Market Systems Development approaches; teaching resources bank, models for strengthening technical and vocational education and training centres and helping young people to find a job; financial education programmes with an emphasis on insurance; MSE services methodologies transferred to the municipal level.</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> The additional SC to be implemented in 2023 will lead to phasing out in the consolidated lines of work.

**Portfolio Outcome 3: Climate Change and the Environment**  
 Contribution to IC Strategy 2021-2024 sub-objective: 3

**Theory of Change description:**  
 If the projects in the thematic area of CC & EM support public sector stakeholders to improve their work and help people to develop positive attitudes and shared responsibility for actions related to climate change adaptation and the environment, it will help to improve the living conditions of vulnerable groups, especially women and young people, and increase their economic, social and environmental resilience.

**Thematic area objective:**  
 Improve capacities to adapt to climate change and solve environmental problems through the efficient implementation of public policies, strengthening networks and the capacities of key actors, and increasing resilience and access to services for people in a vulnerable situation..

<b>(1) Swiss Portfolio Outcomes</b>	<b>(2) Swiss programme contribution</b>	<b>(3) Partner country humanitarian or development outcomes</b>
<p><b>Outcome 1:</b>                      Climate Change Adaptation (CCA), Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Environmental Management (EM) capacities are strengthened / consolidated in public sector institutions and policymakers at the three levels of the state (central, departmental and municipal).</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.1:</b>                      Proportion of public investment at the municipal level allocated to Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Environmental Management.  <b>Baseline (2021):</b> 4% of municipal funds go to EM, DRR and CCA.  <b>Target (2023):</b> 7% of municipal funds go to EM, DRR, CCA.</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.2:</b>                      Number of Autonomous Departmental Governments (GAD) and Autonomous Municipal Governments (GAM) that maintain and/or improve their management in these areas of work.  <b>Baseline (2021):</b> GAM: 95; GAD: 8.  <b>Target (2023):</b> GAM: 95; GAD: 8.</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.3:</b>                      Having strengthened their capacities, the Ministry of Development Planning (MPD) and the Plurinational Authority for Mother Earth (APMT) step up their work to obtain funding for projects that meet the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC).  <b>Baseline (2021):</b> The <u>roadmap and roles</u> that the MPD and APMT should follow and perform to monitor and fulfil the NDC are not sufficiently clear.  <b>Target (2023):</b> Roadmap and roles defined for the monitoring and fulfilment of the NDC.</p>	<p>Swiss Development Cooperation uses its experience to influence the design and implementation of national public policies and contributes to capacity-building and the development of methodologies to consolidate investments in this thematic area. It contributes leadership and knowledge on the subject to the integrated planning system in municipalities, departments and sectors.</p> <p>The public institutions supported by the different projects in this thematic area take it into account in their planning and influence other actors with regard to budget allocation for CCA, DRR and EM.</p> <p>The process of defining responsibilities, monitoring, systematisation and communication of the NDC is supported.</p> <p><b>Assumptions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The state shows an interest in legislation and acts in accordance with it.</li> <li>• The political system endorses actions to guarantee investment in this area.</li> <li>• There is sufficient inter-ministerial coordination.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The public sector does not see environmental issues as a priority.</li> <li>• Possible political interference stops funds being used for public investment in this area.</li> <li>• The economic crisis caused by the pandemic and political instability affect the availability of funds in GAM and GAD.</li> <li>• The necessary coordination is not achieved in public institutions with regard to responsibilities for drawing up the NDC.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outcome 1:</b>                      Sustainable and Balanced Environment in Harmony with Mother Earth (Axis 8, Goals 8.1.3, 8.4.1 and 8.5.1, PDES 2021-2025).</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.1 (PDES 8.1.3.1):</b>                      Number of vulnerable municipalities with forest fire prevention, warning and response plans in place.  <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 10 municipalities.  <b>Target (2025):</b> 60 municipalities (50 additional).</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.2 (PDES 8.4.1.4):</b>                      Percentage of protected areas of national interest with financial sustainability supported by own revenue mechanisms.  <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 14% of protected areas.  <b>Target (2025):</b> 60% of protected areas.</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.3 (PDES 8.5.2.1):</b>                      Number of prioritized watersheds with planning instruments elaborated and being implemented.  <b>Baseline (2020):</b> 14 watersheds (27% of the prioritized watersheds).  <b>Target (2025):</b> 51 watersheds (100% of the prioritized watersheds).</p>

<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Stakeholders have strengthened/consolidated their skills and apply their knowledge in CCA, DRR and EM.</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.1:</b> Number of young people (aged 15-24) and adults who were given training<sup>2</sup> and were able to develop better skills (IED_ARI_1).</p> <p><b>Baseline (2021):</b> Total: 21.500. Young men: 3.000; young women: 3.500. Adult men: 9.000; adult women: 6.000.</p> <p><b>Target (2023):</b> Total: 23.500 (an additional 2'000). Young men: 3.500; young women: 4.000. Adult men: 9.500; adult women: 6.500.</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.2:</b> Number of skills development programmes implemented by the TVET institutions supported by the projects.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2021):</b> 20 programmes. <b>Target (2023):</b> 24 programmes.</p>	<p>Swiss Cooperation in Bolivia has a network of institutions providing training and skills development on CCA/DRR/EM that can contribute intercultural teaching/learning methodologies. Together with their partners (universities, for example), they are working to consolidate technical and vocational education and training processes on CCA/DRR/EM.</p> <p>The training processes on these topics include the integrated management of water resources, environmental management, irrigation and sustainable agriculture.</p> <p><b>Assumptions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Different actors demand technical and vocational education and training.</li> <li>• Training on CCA/DRR and EM is a priority for public sector institutions.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The education system is bureaucratic, and this may have a negative impact on the achievement of results.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Sustainable and balanced environment in harmony with Mother Earth (Axis 8, Goal 8.2.3, PDES 2021-2025).</p> <p><b>Indicator 2.1 (PDES 8.2.3.1):</b> Number of vulnerable municipalities with sufficient technical capacities in disaster risk management.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 20. <b>Target (2025):</b> 81 (61 additional).</p>
<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Resilience has increased in the territories where the projects are working.</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.1:</b> Number of small-scale farms that have increased their income from agriculture, crops and livestock (AFS_ARI_1).</p> <p><b>Baseline (2021):</b> 25.000. <b>Target (2023):</b> 28.000 (an additional 3.000).</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.2:</b> Percentage of beneficiary families reporting an improvement in their quality of life and income security.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2021):</b> 70%. <b>Target (2023):</b> 80%.</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.3:</b> Percentage reduction in imports of mercury with the support of BGI.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2019):</b> 193 tonnes. <b>Target (2023):</b> Reduction in imports.</p>	<p>Swiss Development Cooperation in Bolivia develops alternative economic production models, with access to financial resources for sustainable rural development and agroecology.</p> <p>Shared social responsibility (resource use, separation at source, production of less waste), efficiency and sustainability in service delivery is promoted.</p> <p>Support is provided to draw up regulations and implement legislation related to wastewater treatment and management of solid waste.</p> <p>Advocacy seeks to reduce the use of mercury and promote responsible mining.</p> <p>Increasing resilience to climate change implies improving public policies and investment at the territorial level, and advocacy at the national level.</p> <p><b>Assumptions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public policies on farming and environmental issues in the different ministries give priority to the preservation and defence of Mother Earth.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The state allocates few resources to this thematic area.</li> <li>• The public sector does not see environmental issues as a priority.</li> <li>• The economic crisis caused by the pandemic and political instability affect the availability of funds in GAM and GAD.</li> <li>• Priority is mainly given to economic issues, without taking environmental management into account.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Sustainable and balanced environment in harmony with Mother Earth (Axis 8, Goal 8.3.1 PDES 2021-2025).</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.1 (PDES 3.2.10.1):</b> Water quality index.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 31% 154,5 mil metric tons. <b>Target (2025):</b> 45% 1,02 million metric tons.</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.2 (PDES 8.3.1.1):</b> Number of new, expanded, upgraded and/or rehabilitated domestic wastewater treatment plants.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 37. <b>Target (2025):</b> 48.</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.3 (PDES 8.3.1.2):</b> Number of municipalities with infrastructure for the use or final disposal of solid waste or closure of dumps.</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 26 (7.7% of the total number of municipalities). <b>Target (2025):</b> 102 (30% of the total number municipalities).</p> <p><b>Complementary proxy indicator (PDES 3.2.9.1):</b> Area under irrigation (thousands of hectares).</p> <p><b>Baseline (2020):</b> 520 mil hectares. <b>Target (2025):</b> 1 million hectares.</p>

<sup>2</sup> All the training courses implemented are taken into account, whether or not they are certified and regardless of their duration, they equip the beneficiaries with practical skills they can use in their day-to-day work.



<p><b>(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss programme)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy dialogue and advocacy to consolidate public policies on CCA, EM and DRR.</li> <li>• Capacity-building and the development of professional and vocational skills promoted through alliances and institutional networks supported by Swiss Cooperation.</li> <li>• Development/consolidation of replicable climate resilience models and improvement of environmental quality services in urban and rural areas.</li> <li>• Links and synergies with global cooperation programmes (SIRWASH, Resilient Andes – PGCC, HAME, BRAVA), humanitarian aid (MiResiliencia) and SECO projects.</li> <li>• Applied research on climate change adaptation: participation in research networks producing evidence to influence policy.</li> </ul>
<p><b>(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss programme)</b></p> <p><u>Financial resources:</u> CHF 3.630.000</p> <p><u>Modalities:</u> contributions to ministries, public universities, mandates and triangular cooperation.</p> <p><u>Strategic partners:</u> a) Public Sector: Ministry of the Environment and Water, Ministry of Education, public universities, Plurinational School for Public Management (EGPP), departmental and municipal governments; b) Private Sector: private universities, training and enterprise institutes; c) project partner NGOs; y d) Cooperation Agencies: SIDA, UNIDO, European Union, IDB and World Bank.</p>
<p><b>(6) Management results/performance, including indicators (Swiss programme),</b> see chapter 6 of Cooperation Programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The cross-cutting theme of gender is given priority and the work is intensified with targets for women’s participation and differentiated governance strategies for river basins and territories. The CSPM approach is applied in projects that are more politically sensitive. DRR is included as a working principle.</li> <li>• Consolidation of public sector institutions/programmes: Plurinational Authority for Mother Earth (APMT), National River Basin Plan (PNC), University System for Research on Climate Change. The Integrated Planning System at the national and subnational level effectively takes into account CCA, DRR and EM issues, with adequate budgets.</li> <li>• The main benchmarks are: agreements signed with public institutions enable formal support to be provided to APMT, MMAyA, MPD (for Biocultura and Resilient Andes); decision on the continuity of the donor working group on the PNC.</li> <li>• Projects in this thematic area complete their closeout phase satisfactorily: GIA will take forward phasing out (2022), PIAACC and Biocultura phasing down (2023), and GAM will engage in a mix of phasing down and over (2023), forging links with the Swedish cooperation agency and its Zero Waste project for eventual phasing over.</li> <li>• Knowledge management is implemented, with experiences, tools, models and learning systematised and transferred to key stakeholders to strengthen their work and ensure its continuity. The main outputs are: Capacity Development System for biocultural territorial management; shared learning agenda with universities on issues related to climate change adaptation; successful experiences in solid waste management and wastewater treatment with a focus on re-use and the circular economy.</li> </ul>

## Annex 3: Monitoring system

The system has four main purposes:

- **Steering** the Bolivia Phasing out Programme Bolivia to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of the Swiss programme.
- **Accountability** to SDC head office and the external stakeholders involved<sup>3</sup> regarding the results.
- **Learning** of Phasing out Programme implementers and partners based on the achievements and lessons learned.
- **Close monitoring** of the accountability process at the programme, office and staff level.


To achieve these, four levels of observation need to be regularly monitored:

1. The context in Bolivia

2. Progress in Bolivia

3. Expected outcomes of the Swiss Programme<sup>3</sup>. Gestión del Programa por parte de la Cooperación Suiza

4. Programme management by Swiss Development Cooperation



The monitoring system does not seek to arrive at exact measurements of progress related to the Programme; instead, it aims to make an adequate effort to produce plausible information about the extent to which Switzerland is contributing to the achievement of country objectives and identify the adjustments that may be necessary.

<sup>3</sup> Decision-makers in Switzerland, Swiss government, VIPFE, project partners, EU with regard to the Joint Strategy

The monitoring system's **main instruments** are shown in the table below:

Instruments	Remarks	Frequency
Financial planning		3-4 times per year
Visits to projects		At least one per year for each project
Project review		Once or twice per phase
Internal management committee		Several per year <sup>4</sup>
Meetings with Swiss NGOs		At least one per year
Meetings with local partners		At least one per year
Portfolio review with Ministry of Development Planning (VIPFE)		At least one per year
Meetings with ministries	For policy dialogue and technical discussions on projects	Several per year
Monitoring of development-related changes (MERV)		Twice per year
Review of scenarios and their consequences for the implementation of the Phasing out Programme		Twice per year
Office Management Report - OMR	Analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Embassy with regard to cooperation work	One per year
Internal Control System – ICS	Analysis of the risks faced by the Embassy, including in cooperation activities	One per year
Annual report		One per year
Detailed yearly planning		Once per year

## Annex 4: Planned budget 2022 - 2024

Phasing out Programme for Bolivia / Programme duration January 2022 - December 2024

Domain	2022	2023	2024	Total	in %
Governance (Swiss Outcome: 1)	720.000	250.000	130.000	1.100.000	8%
Economic Development (Swiss Outcome: 2)	5.630.000	3.350.000	330.000	9.310.000	62%
Climate Change (Swiss Outcome: 3)	2.200.000	1.100.000	330.000	3.630.000	24%
Miscellaneous/Other	450.000	300.000	210.000	960.000	6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.000.000</b>	<b>5.000.000</b>	<b>1.000.000</b>	<b>15.000.000</b>	<b>100%</b>

Because the CDS project covers the three thematic areas, the budget for it has been distributed equally among them.

<sup>4</sup> The internal management committee will no longer concentrate on preparing new projects. Instead, it will be the forum for discussing different strategic, cooperation-related, financial, administrative and communications issues.


## Annex 5: Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>AAV</b>	Action against Violence
<b>AJ</b>	Access to Justice
<b>APMT</b>	Autoridad Plurinacional de la Madre Tierra (Plurinational Authority for Mother Earth)
<b>AWP</b>	Annual Work Plan
<b>BDP</b>	Banco de Desarrollo Productivo (Productive Development Bank)
<b>BIM</b>	Business Investment Management
<b>BIOCULTURA</b>	Local management and public policies for the conservation and sustainable use of Andean ecosystems in Bolivia
<b>CAF</b>	Development Bank of Latin America
<b>CAN</b>	Andean Community
<b>CC</b>	Climate Change
<b>CCA</b>	Climate Change Adaptation
<b>CDE</b>	Centre for Development and Environment
<b>C4D</b>	Communication for Development
<b>CDS</b>	Collaborative Dialogue and Support
<b>CELAC</b>	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
<b>CS</b>	Cooperation Strategy
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisation
<b>CSPM</b>	Conflict-Sensitive Programme Management
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>DFI</b>	Development Finance Institution
<b>DRR</b>	Disaster Risk Reduction
<b>ECLAC</b>	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
<b>EM</b>	Environmental Management
<b>EPR</b>	End of Phase Report
<b>EPROR</b>	End of Project Report
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FDFA</b>	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
<b>GAD</b>	Gobierno Autónomo Departamental (Autonomous Departmental Government)
<b>GAM</b>	Gobiernos Autónomos Municipales / Proyecto Gestión Ambiental Municipal (Autonomous Municipal Governments / Municipal Environmental Management Project)
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GIAR</b>	Grupo de Intervención y Acción Rápida (Rapid Response and Intervention Group)
<b>GruS</b>	Grupo de Socios para el Desarrollo de Bolivia (Development Partners Group)
<b>Ha</b>	Hectare
<b>ICTs</b>	Information and Communications Technologies
<b>IDB</b>	Inter-American Development Bank
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INIAF</b>	Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria y Forestal (National Farming and Forestry Research Institute)
<b>ISC</b>	Internal Control System
<b>KM</b>	Knowledge Management
<b>LACD</b>	Latin America and the Caribbean Division
<b>LAIA</b>	Latin American Integration Association
<b>LwV</b>	Life without Violence
<b>MAS</b>	Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism)

<b>MDPyEP</b>	Ministerio de Desarrollo Productivo y Economía Plural (Ministry of Productive Development and the Plural Economy)
<b>MDRyT</b>	Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural y Tierras (Ministry of Rural Development and Lands)
<b>MERCOSUR</b>	Southern Common Market
<b>MERV</b>	Monitoring of Development-Related Changes
<b>MIC</b>	Middle-Income Country
<b>MMAyA</b>	Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua (Ministry of the Environment and Water)
<b>MP</b>	Ministerio Público (Public Prosecution Service)
<b>MPD</b>	Ministerio de la Planificación del Desarrollo (Ministry of Development Planning)
<b>MSD</b>	Market Systems Development
<b>MSE</b>	Micro and Small Enterprise
<b>MSMEs</b>	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
<b>NDC</b>	Nationally Determined Contributions
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NPO</b>	National Programme Officer
<b>OAS</b>	Organization of American States
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>OMR</b>	Office Management Report
<b>PDES</b>	Plan de Desarrollo Económico Social (Economic and Social Development Plan)
<b>PIACC</b>	Proyecto de Investigación Aplicada y Adaptación al Cambio Climático (Climate Change Adaptation and Applied Research Project)
<b>PNC</b>	Plan Nacional de Cuencas (National River Basin Plan)
<b>PPE</b>	Personal Protective Equipment
<b>PROMyPE</b>	Proyecto de Micro y Pequeñas Empresas (Micro and Small Enterprises Project)
<b>PSE</b>	Private Sector Engagement
<b>RUNO</b>	Registro Único Nacional de ONG (Single National Register of NGOs)
<b>SCF</b>	Swiss Cultural Fund
<b>SCORE</b>	Sustaining Competitive and Responsible Enterprises
<b>SDC</b>	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SECO</b>	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
<b>SEPDAVI</b>	Servicio Plurinacional de Asistencia a la Víctima (Plurinational Victim Support Service)
<b>SIDA</b>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<b>SIFEM</b>	Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets
<b>SIJPU</b>	Servicios Integrales de Justicia Plurinacional (Plurinational Integrated Justice Services)
<b>SIPPO</b>	Swiss Import Promotion Program
<b>SPIE</b>	Sistema de Planificación Integral del Estado (State Integrated Planning System)
<b>SUB</b>	Sistema Universitario Boliviano (Bolivian University Service)
<b>TVET</b>	Tecnical and vocational education and training
<b>UMSS</b>	Universidad Mayor de San Simón (San Simón University)
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNASUR</b>	Union of South American Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>VIPFE</b>	Viceministerio de Inversión Pública y Financiamiento Externo (Vice-Ministry of Public Investment and External Financing)
<b>WOGA</b>	Whole of Government Approach

## Annex 6: Maps


### SDC intervention regions on the basis of the Existing Programme




#### REFERENCE

● FINANCIAL VOLUME INVESTED BY DEPARTMENT


#### Overall budget allocation



## SDC intervention regions according to Budget Allocation



### Overall budget allocation



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